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THE FRAMERS, CHILDREN, AND FREE EXPRESSION
KEVIN W. SAUNDERS*
Editor's Note- When this article was accepted, the case Video
Software Dealers Association v. Schwarzeneggert had not yet
been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. Oral argu-
ments were heard in the case on November 2, 2010.: This
article went to press while the case was still before the
Court and either serves as an additional argument based
on the intellectual atmosphere of the founding generation
in support of a decision to uphold the state law or as a
criticism, based on the same evidence, of any decision to
hold the law unconstitutional or to not allow for a more
narrowly tailored law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Would James Madison have thought his stepson John had
the constitutional right to purchase and play the video game Vice
City?' Would Thomas Jefferson have thought his daughter
Martha had the right to participate in the virtual realm of the
World of Warcraft?2 Certainly, these are difficult questions to
answer, but not only for the obvious reasons.
The games, of course, did not exist in the founding era, and
that would preclude any actual consideration by the Framers.
But neither did telephone taps and bugs exist in the era of the
framing, and that has not stopped the consideration, in constitu-
tional interpretation, of what the Framers would have thought
about them. In Katz v. United States,' the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether or not recording a person conversing over a public
telephone in a glass booth constituted a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. The Court held that it was and that the
proper test of constitutionality was whether the defendant had
justifiably relied on the privacy that the telephone booth
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
t 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S.Ct. 2398 (2010).
Transcript of Oral Argument, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n,
No. 08-1448 (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral
arguments/argument-transcripts/08-1448.pdf.
1. GRAND THITr AuTo: VicE Cmv (Rockstar Games 2002).
2. WORLD OF WARCRAFr (Blizzard Entertainment 2004).
3. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
187
188 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25
afforded, a privacy that would cover what was said, if not what
might be seen to occur within a glass booth.
While the majority opinion did not reference any thoughts
of the Framers, Justice Black, in his dissent, did. He argued that
the Fourth Amendment applies only to physical places and tangi-
ble property. His reliance on what the Framers would have
thought was based in analogy to what did exist at the time:
Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possi-
bility at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But
eavesdropping (and wiretapping is nothing more than
eavesdropping by telephone) was . . . "an ancient practice
which at common law was condemned as a nuisance.... In
those days the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under
the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls
seeking out private discourse." There can be no doubt that
the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had
desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained
by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the
appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment.'
So, a similar analysis for the question at issue here would
involve what the Framers thought about the influences existing
at the time and their availability to children.
The real difficulty in applying even this sort of analogical
reasoning to First Amendment issues is a lack of clarity as to what
the Framers generally intended in the free expression guaran-
tees. Indeed, Blackstone's view of the liberty of the press, a view
that speaks to the scope of freedom of expression in the found-
ing era, is far more limited than the modern view. "The liberty
of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but
this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications,
and not in the freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published."' It is that view that Leonard Levy argues was
intended by the First Amendment's protection for expression.'
4. Katz, 389 U.S. at 366 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967) (citations omitted)).
5. 4 WIui-usm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 (1765-69).
6. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESs (1985). Dis-
agreeing with work he formerly published, Levy noted:
I gave the misleading impression that freedom of the press meant to
the Framers merely the absence of prior restraints. . . . I sometimes
declared that they shared Blackstone's view. . . . I mean, first, that the
criminal law held people responsible for abuse of that freedom. Sec-
ond, I mean not to exhaust the meanings of freedom of the press by
identifying it as, at the least, freedom from prior restraint.
Id. at xi.
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While there is strong historical debate surrounding this claim,
the historical arguments seem limited to increased protection for
political speech. For example, Vincent Blasi has argued that the
primary intended function of the First Amendment was to pro-
vide protection for speech critical of the government, not just
allowing such expression to be offered to the public at the risk of
future punishment but also providing protection against that
punishment.'
What does not seem viable to argue is that the Framers
themselves also intended to go beyond political speech and pro-
tect entertainment. The expansion of the First Amendment to
include entertainment was firmly established only in 1948 in Win-
ters v. New York.' The state had argued that the First Amendment
did not protect the sort of "sanguinary or salacious publications"
at issue,' but the Court rejected the claim:
We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the consti-
tutional protection for a free press applies only to the
exposition of ideas. The line between the informing and
the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that
basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propa-
ganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement,
teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of
any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best
of literature.' 0
The conclusion seems reasonable. It may well be difficult to
draw any sharp line between entertainment and the sort of politi-
cal speech that the Framers might be said to have intended as the
focus for First Amendment protection. Thus, even if we have no
evidence that the Framers intended to protect entertainment, its
7. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 Am. B.
FouNo. REs. J. 521 (1977). In the article, Blasi "examine[s] the sources and
premises of the idea that free expression is valuable in part because of the func-
tion it performs in checking the abuse of official power." Id. at 528.
[T]he most influential free-speech theorists of the eighteenth cen-
tury-those who drafted the First Amendment and their mentors-
placed great emphasis on the role free expression can play in guard-
ing against breaches of trust by public officials. Indeed, if one had to
identify the single value that was uppermost in the minds of the per-
sons who drafted and ratified the First Amendment, this checking
value would be the most likely candidate.
Id. at 527.
8. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
9. Id. at 510.
10. Id.
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ties to the sort of expression that may well have been within the
Framers' intent justify the extension in Winters.
This conclusion, however, applies only to entertainment
presented to adults. Children are another matter. The difficulty
in drawing the line between entertainment and political speech
does not carry over to drawing a line between children and
adults. To conclude that the Framers' values enshrined in the
First Amendment applied equally to children, even with regard
to political speech, let alone entertainment, requires further
analysis. Given the dearth of material speaking to the intended
meaning of the First Amendment generally, it should hardly be
surprising that little or nothing can be said conclusively about
the thoughts of the Framers with regard to children, entertain-
ment, and the freedom of expression.
The best that can be done is to examine the Framers'
thoughts with regard to children generally, and then consider
the implications of those thoughts on the issue under considera-
tion here. Even in that regard, there is little direct evidence of
their thoughts about children, in the sense of actual writings by
the Framers. As a sort of second-best evidence, guidance might
be sought in the writings of those who would have influenced the
Framers. It has been said that "the revolutionaries deserve to
have their philosophical reflections read carefully because they
seriously used philosophical ideas while leading one of the great
political transformations of history."" While that speaks most
clearly to the social and political philosophers whose thoughts
may have been at the core of the American Revolution, the Fram-
ers seem likely also to have been influenced in other areas by the
philosophical work they read. An examination of the thoughts of
those philosophers regarding children and education should
help to uncover what would have been the Framers' thoughts on
the issue of children and free expression. In addition, religion,
psychology, and law in the era are relevant.
This Article will proceed by first examining, in Section II,
why the question matters. The attempts of various state and local
governments to shield children from what they see as harmful
expression have been struck down as violations of the First
Amendment. At least with regard to analyzing the intent of any
of the Framers, if the remainder of this analysis shows that chil-
dren should not have a protected right to receive or offer
whatever expression they desire, it is these cases that will have
been incorrectly decided. Section III will then examine what lit-
11. MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4
(1978).
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tie direct evidence there is and also look to what sources would
have influenced the Framers. Section IV examines the conclu-
sions, regarding children, of philosophers who had their influ-
ence on the founding generation. Section V will then turn to the
religious and psychological teachings, and the law of the era to
try to determine their influence.
II. WHY IT MATTERS: THE COURTS AND
VIDEO GAME LEGISLATION
The area in which the issue of First Amendment rights and
children has had the greatest impact recently has been in efforts
by state and local governments to limit the access of children to
violent video games. The first of these attempts was a 2000 ordi-
nance by the unified city and county council for the City of Indi-
anapolis and Marion County, Indiana.' 2 The ordinance required
video arcades to segregate their more adult games, those with
violent or sexually explicit content, from more innocuous games
and allow children under eighteen to play the more adult games
only if accompanied by a parent, guardian, or custodian."
When the video game industry challenged the ordinance,
the federal district court refused to enjoin its enforcement; the
protective efforts of the city/county, however, did not fare as well
at the appellate level. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, with Judge Posner writing, rejected the psycho-
logical evidence of harm to children" that had swayed the coun-
cil, according to legislative history, and the district court." This
rejection was important, because if children do have full First
Amendment rights in this context, the governmental interest
required to overcome those rights must be compelling.'" While
the psychological well-being of children may be compelling, the
evidence, in the Seventh Circuit's view, did not show the limits in
the ordinance to be necessary to that well-being.
With regard to the underlying issue of whether or not chil-
dren do have First Amendment rights, the court said:
Children have First Amendment rights. This is not merely
a matter of pressing the First Amendment to a dryly logical
12. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946
(S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994
(2001).
13. See id. at 946-48.
14. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th
Cir. 2001).
15. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
16. See, e.g., Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir.
2008); see also infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
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extreme. The murderous fanaticism displayed by young
German soldiers in World War II, alumni of the Hider
Jugend, illustrates the danger of allowing government to
control the access of children to information and opinion.
Now that eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, it is
obvious that they must be allowed the freedom to form
their political views on the basis of uncensored speech
before they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a
blank [sic] when they first exercise the franchise. And since
an eighteen-year-old's right to vote is a right personal to
him rather than a right that is to be exercised on his behalf
by his parents, the right of parents to enlist the aid of the
state to shield their children from ideas of which the par-
ents disapprove cannot be plenary either. People are
unlikely to become well-functioning, independent-minded
adults and responsible citizens if they are raised in an intel-
lectual bubble.' 7
Thus, it would seem that, in the court's view, children not
only enjoy First Amendment rights but that these rights cannot
be limited even in support of parental wishes that their children
not have access to material the parents see as injurious.
There is a more recent opinion from the Seventh Circuit,
also written by Judge Posner, that may cast a somewhat different
light on the analysis in the video games case. That case, Nuxoll v.
Indian Prairie School District," grew out of a school's refusal to
allow a student to wear a T-shirt bearing the legend "Be Happy,
Not Gay" in response to a day dedicated to tolerance of alterna-
tive sexual orientation. The school district and the district court
considered the shirt to be an affront to the school's gay and les-
bian students.' The appellate court, however, concluded that
the use of the word "gay" was, in the context of the particular
message, a play on the word "happy."20 The school had been
willing to allow a T-shirt that said "Be Happy, Be Straight," and
that seemed to convey the same message."'
While the appellate court found the particular decision of
the school system unjustified, it refused to issue a general injunc-
tion against the rule under which the shirt had been banned.
Turning to the First Amendment and children, Posner wrote for
the court:
17. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 576-77 (citations omitted).
18. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
19. Id. at 670.
20. Id. at 675-76.
21. Id. at 675.
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A heavy federal constitutional hand on the regulation of
student speech by school authorities would make little
sense. The contribution that kids can make to the market-
place in ideas and opinions is modest and a school's coun-
tervailing interest in protecting its students from offensive
speech by their classmates is undeniable. Granted,
because 18-year-olds can now vote, high-school students
should not be "raised in an intellectual bubble," . . . which
would be the effect of forbidding all discussion of public
issues by such students. But Neuqua Valley High School
has not tried to do that. It has prohibited only (1) deroga-
tory comments on (2) unalterable or otherwise deeply
rooted personal characteristics about which most people,
including-perhaps especially including-adolescent
schoolchildren, are highly sensitive.2 2
The court went on to recognize evidence that suggested
"adolescent students subjected to derogatory comments about
such characteristics may find it even harder than usual to concen-
trate on their studies and perform up to the school's expecta-
tions."23  Thus, the court saw the potential for a form of
disruption that could allow school restrictions on speech.
What explains the difference between these two results? It
might well be the difference between government regulating the
expression individuals choose to receive outside the schools, in
the video game case, compared to schools regulating the expres-
sion that children are subjected to in those schools. While the
Supreme Court has said that children do not lose whatever First
Amendment rights they may have when they enter the school-
house,2 4 later cases make it clear that expression rights within the
school do not enjoy the strength they do in other contexts. The
sexually suggestive nomination speech at a school assembly that
the Court considered sanctionable in Bethel School District v. Fra-
ser? would certainly receive full protection if presented outside
22. Id. at 671 (quoting Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577).
23. Id. (citing David M. Huebner et al., Experiences of Harassment, Discrimi-
nation, and Physical Violence Among Young Gay and Bisexual Men, 94 Am. J. PUB.
HEAILTH 1200, 1200-01 (2004); MICHAEL BOCHENEK & A. WIDNEY BROWN,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYs: VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINA-
TION AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN U.S.
SCHOOts 1-3 (2001), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uslgbt/toc.htm;
AM. Assoc. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDuc. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS. BULLYING, TEAS-
ING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 37 (2001), available at www.aauw.org/
learn/research/upload/hostilehallways.pdf).
24. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
25. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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the schools. Likewise, the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner that
resulted in a suspension upheld in Morse v. Frederick2 could not
have been subject to sanction other than in the school context.
While the school versus public distinction may easily explain
the difference between the two Seventh Circuit cases, it does not
explain the different views by the same judge with regard to chil-
dren and their future political roles as voters. The video game
case stressed the students' civil responsibilities, while the T-shirt
case minimized that concern and the potential contribution of
schoolchildren to the marketplace of ideas. Instead, perhaps the
difference is between an ordinance that limited access to violent
video games until the child turned eighteen and a school rule
that could be seen as shielding, at least among others, younger
children.
If it was really the age that made a difference in the Indian-
apolis ordinance, the result could still be consistent with the
argument that not all children should have extensive First
Amendment rights that permit them to receive whatever expres-
sion they wish. The argument against insulating children from
expression up until the very moment they turn eighteen might
be justified by the right asserted by Judge Posner of the then
eighteen-year-old to cast a well-informed vote. The right of the
child, before turning eighteen, to receive information would
then be seen not so much as an intrinsic right, supported by the
value of free expression, but as an instrumental right tied to the
right to vote soon to be attained.27 Limiting children's access to
expression until they reach the age of seventeen could then
address both these interests; younger children would be
shielded, while an individual would have a full year, before turn-
ing eighteen, to play as many violent video games as it takes to
become a competent voter.
If it was the age selected that made the difference for Judge
Posner, that subtlety has been lost on later federal courts in other
judicial circuits. The next video game case to come to the courts
grew out of a St. Louis County ordinance, also passed in 2000.28
That ordinance also addressed video game arcades, as well as
26. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
27. SeeJOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDoMs FOR? 106-11 (1996); FRANK-
IN E. ZIMRNG, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982). Dean
John Garvey and Professor Franklin Zimring have made similar points about
the instrumental, rather than intrinsic importance of free speech rights for chil-
dren, Dean Garvey describing spring training for young future voters and Pro-
fessor Zimring discussing a learners' permit stage for adolescent speech.
28. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County., 329 F.3d 954,
956 (8th Cir. 2003).
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sales and rentals, but the limits applied only to children under
seventeen.29  It, too, was declared unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds.so Still later ordinances and statutes have
consistently been declared unconstitutional, whether the limita-
tions apply to those under eighteen or seventeen.3 ' Thus,
whateverJudge Posner may have intended, the position that chil-
dren have full First Amendment rights is having a continuing
impact on the ability of government to shield them from the vio-
lent video games that are believed to be harmful.
The conclusion that minors have First Amendment rights
that enable them to play violent video games or that the video
game industry has a First Amendment right to market its wares to
minors would not necessarily preclude regulation outright. What
it does do is require that any regulations pass strict scrutiny
review of the courts; the limitations must be necessary to a com-
pelling governmental interest. The courts generally have been
willing to accept that the states have a compelling interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of children.3 2 The sticking
point has been in establishing that the video game regulation is
necessary to that interest. While in some of the more recent
decisions, courts have been more accepting of the psychological
evidence," even those courts have had difficulty finding it neces-
sary to limit violent video game play.
29. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1126, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
30. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d at 959.
31. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d
950 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S.Ct. 2398 (2010); Entm't Software Ass'n v.
Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823
(M.D. La. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D.
Mich. 2006); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180
(W.D. Wash. 2004).
32. See, e.g., Swanson, 519 F.3d at 771-72 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sable
Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("As the Supreme
Court has recognized, '[T] here is a compelling interest in protecting the physi-
cal and psychological well-being of minors."')).
33. Compare Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772 ("[W]e believe that the State's evi-
dence provides substantial support for its contention that violent video games
have a deleterious effect upon the psychological well-being of minors.") and
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007
WL 2261546, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("[T]his court is not as doubtful as others
courts have been as to the legislature's power to restrict the access of minors to
violent video games or as skeptical of Dr. Anderson's [the leading researcher on
the effects of violent video games] conclusions.") with Am. Amusement Mach.
Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Common sense says that
the City's claim of harm to its citizens from these games is implausible, at best
wildly speculative.").
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Some of the difficulty has been in a failure of the courts to
understand statistical analysis. For example, in a case growing
out of Minnesota's attempt to limit minors' access to video
games, the district court judge seemed not to understand meta-
analysis." The judge said, speaking of the work of the leading
researcher in the field, "Dr. Anderson's meta-analysis seems to
suggest that one can take a number of studies, each of which he
admits do not prove the proposition in question, and 'stack them
up' until a collective proof emerges."3 ' But, that is the nature of
meta-analysis, and a non-technical example shows that it does
make sense. If two major league baseball players play a game in
which one gets two hits in five times at bat and the other goes
one for five, it would not prove the proposition that the first bat-
ter is a better hitter. The same would be true if it happened in a
second game. But, if it happens over the course of the season,
the first batter is headed for the Hall of Fame and the second the
minor leagues. The instances that did not prove the proposition
have been "stacked up" to constitute such a proof.
Even if the court had understood the psychological studies,
it may be that the tasks set for the social science are simply too
difficult to meet. For example, the Eighth Circuit, in its second
examination of the issue, explained the problem. Even though
finding substantial support for the state's need to limit the access
of minors, the court said that "the evidence falls short of estab-
lishing the statistical certainty of causation demanded" by the stan-
dards set in the court's earlier examination." The court went on
to say:
Whatever our intuitive (dare we say commonsense) feel-
ings regarding the effect that the extreme violence por-
trayed in the above-described video games may well have
upon the psychological well-being of minors, [precedent]
requires us to hold that, having failed to come forth with
incontrovertible proof of a causal relationship between the
exposure to such violence and subsequent psychological
dysfunction, the State has not satisfied its evidentiary bur-
den. The requirement of such a high level of proof may
reflect a refined estrangement from reality, but apply it we
must.37
34. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 n.1 (D.
Minn. 2006).
35. Id.
36. Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772 (emphasis added).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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Incontrovertible proof and certainty of causation are simply
not the stuff of statistical analysis. It may well indicate the diffi-
culty the psychological sciences will always have in satisfying the
strict scrutiny test."
There is another area of science that might have more
promise. Relatively recent work in neuroscience has demon-
strated that the teenage brain is quite literally under construc-
tion, with those areas involved in judgment and inhibition
undergoing major changes." Specifically, a study by Dr. William
Kronenberger, a clinical psychologist at the Indiana University
School of Medicine, showed that increased exposure to media
violence has a negative effect on adolescent brain activity in the
region vital to judgment and inhibition." But, when Dr.
Kronenberger's testimony was presented in court, the video
games industry found a psychologist who testified that the fact
thatjudgment and inhibition were not occurring in the expected
region of the brain did not mean that they were not occurring
elsewhere, and the Seventh Circuit accepted that response.'
38. A further difficulty is found in the suggestion that psychological stud-
ies must show that violent video games harm the psychological well-being of
children in the absence of other violent media. See Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL
2261546, at *11 (stating that "at this point, there has been no showing that
violent video games as defined in the Act, in the absence of other violent media,
cause injury to children"). The isolation from other media sources, and per-
haps life in general that seems to have been asked for herc is simply something
that cannot be done with children. Another complaint, that laboratory studies
measured aggressive acts rather than violent acts, also ignores an ethical con-
cern. As the district court in the Indianapolis case noted:
As for plaintiffs' proposed requirement of studies that definitively
show a causal relationship between exposure to violent video games
and actually harmful aggression, it is completely unremarkable that an
academic study would use proxy variables to stand in for measures of
actual, harmful aggression. The prospect of controlled experiments
with human subjects that could result in aggression inflicting actual
harm raises a few ethical issues, to put it mildly. Surely the constitu-
tionality of a law does not depend on whether such experiments have
been conducted.
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 964 (S.D. Ind.
2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001).
39. For an examination of the science and discussion of potential legal
impact, see Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between Law and Neuroscience: Mod-
ern Brain Science, Media Influences and Juvenile justice, 2 UTAH L. RE-v. 695 (2005).
For a more general discussion, see BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMA. TEEN: WHAT
THE NEw DISCOVERIES ABOUT THE TEENAGE BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIns
(2008).
40. See W.G. Kronenberger et al., Media Violence Exposure and Executive
Functioning in Aggressive and Control Adolescents, 61 J. CLINICAL Psycol 725
(2005).
41. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
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While the response may be logically true, there is no indication
that judgment and inhibition do occur elsewhere, and there are
case studies that indicate the centrality of the region in which Dr.
Kronenberger found deficiencies.4 2
The free-speech absolutist would clearly agree with the anal-
ysis of the lower federal courts. Children have the right, under
such an approach, to obtain whatever materials they might wish,
and they have the right to express themselves in any way they
might choose. For the originalist," the answers must turn on
what the Framers would have intended. However, given the tre-
mendous expansion of the First Amendment's scope in the case
law from what seems to have been a rather limited intent of the
Framers' for what speech would be protected, the hypothetical
question of the Framers' intent must be narrowed; the question
must be whether the Framers would have intended the free
expression rights that would come to exist to apply to children as
well as adults. Once again, the best evidence of that issue is to be
found in the rather limited actual writings of the Framers and
also in the philosophical, psychological, religious, and legal
works that would have influenced their thinking.
III. WHAT THE FRAMERS SAID AND READ
Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to Peter Carr, dated
August 10, 1787:
The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man
as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a
stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given
them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened
by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body.4 4
It is clear that Jefferson saw the moral sense as one that is
developed through experience. It is also clear that he saw par-
ents as having-or at least that they should have-strong control
over their children. In a 1790 letter to Thomas Mann Randolph,
42. The cases are discussed in Steven W. Anderson et al., Impairment of
Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032, 1032-33 (1999).
43. Other, non-originalist, theories that would limit First Amendment
freedom when expression involves children are examined in KEVIN W. SAUN-
DERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2003).
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in CITI-
ZEN JEFFERSON: THE WIT AND WISDOM OF AN AMERICAN SAGE 14 (John P. Kamin-
ski ed., 1994) [hereinafter CITIZENJEFFERSON]. Jefferson was Peter Carr's uncle
and became his guardian, after the death of Carr's father. See HAROLD HELLEN-
BRAND, THE UNFINISHED REVOi.UTION: EDUCATION AND) POLITICS IN THE
THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 44 (1990).
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he wrote, "[n]ature knows no laws between parent and child, but
the will of the parent."4 5 Jefferson further stresses the impor-
tance of youth in the development of character, and presumably
then the importance of parents and tutors, in a letter to Martha
Jefferson. "It is while we are young that the habit of industry is
formed. If not then, it never is afterwards. The fortune of our
lives therefore depends on employing well the short period of
youth.""
Jefferson also recognized the potential negative influence of
acquaintanceship with the wrong sort of companion. In a letter
to Tom Jefferson Randolph, who had gone to Philadelphia to
attend college at the age of fifteen, Jefferson wrote:
When I recollect that at fourteen years of age, the whole
care and direction of myself was thrown on myself entirely,
without a relation or friend qualified to advise or guide
me, and recollect the various sorts of bad company with
which I associated from time to time, I am astonished I did
not turn off with some of them, and become as worthless to
society as they were. I had the good fortune to become
acquainted very early with some characters of very high
standing, and to feel the incessant wish that I could ever
become what they were. . . . [B]e very select in the society
you attach yourself to, avoid taverns, drinkers, smokers,
idlers, and dissipated persons generally; for it is with such
that broils and contentions arise; and you will find your
path more easy and tranquil.4 7
Jefferson's concern that exposure to the wrong sort of per-
son would corrupt youth had an impact on his recommendations
with regard to education. He opposed sending young Americans
to Europe for their education, saying that an education in
England would teach drinking, horse racing, and boxing, and an
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph (Oct. 22,
1790), in CITIZEN JEFFERSON, supra note 44, at 86.
46. Letter from ThomasJefferson to MarthaJefferson (Mar. 28, 1787), in
CITIZEN JEFFERSON, supra note 44, at 124.
47. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tom Jefferson Randolph (Nov. 24,
1808), in EDWARD BOYKIN, TO THE GIRIS AND Boys: BEING THE DELIGTFUL, Lrr-
TLE-KNOWN LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON TO AND FROM His CHILDREN AND
GRANDCHILDREN 182-86 (1964). Jefferson, in saying he had been left alone at
the age of fourteen, would appear to be referencing the death of his father.
Yet, Jefferson's father had not left him completely unequipped to cope with the
world. "[Hlis path had been laid out for him by a father who was determined
that his son would receive the classical education that had been denied to
him. ... [Tlhe father pointed the son in the direction of social responsibility
and steady development." EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A
RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 9 (1996).
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education on the continent would lead to dissipation and infidel-
ity." This concern over the contagiousness of European immo-
rality was not limited to what we currently view as youth. He
believed that a young man should not go to Europe unchaper-
oned until he was at least thirty."
Jefferson also believed that parents could have a negative
influence on their children, since children would imitate their
bad behavior, as well as the good. In this regard, he expressed a
special concern over slavery:
The whole commerce between master and slave is a perpet-
ual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most unre-
mitting despotism on the one part, and degrading
submissions on the other. Our children see this, and learn
to imitate it; for man is an imitative animal. This quality is
the germ of all education in him. From his cradle to his
grave he is learning to do what he sees others do.. . . The
parent storms, the child looks on, catches the lineaments
of wrath, puts on the same airs in the circle of smaller
slaves, gives a loose to his worst of passions, and thus
nursed, educated, and daily exercised in tyranny, cannot
but be stamped by it with odious peculiarities."
Ignoring the ramifications ofJefferson's criticism of slavery
based not on injustice to the slave but on the educational impact
on the slave owner's children, this statement certainly shows Jef-
ferson's belief that children will imitate bad behavior and should
be shielded from it.
He also seems to have been willing to take parents to task for
failure to impose their authority in disciplining children. In an
1822 letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, he wrote, "The article of disci-
pline is the most difficult in American education. Premature
ideas of independence, too little repressed by parents, beget a
spirit of insubordination, which is the great obstacle.""'
Jefferson also saw a role for the primary schools, whose
establishment he advocated, in the moral education of children.
In those schools, "in addition to instruction in reading, writing,
and arithmetic, young pupils would receive lessons in moral
48. See GAUSTAD, supra note 47, at 162 ("He advised young men against a
European education because of the effect it might have on their morals and
private behavior.").
49. Id. at 155.
50. THOMAS JEFFERSON, QUERY XVIII, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
(1781), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: A CHRONOLOGY OF His THOUGHTs 43
(Jerry Holmes ed., 2002).
51. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822)
in CITIZEN JEFFERSON, supra note 44, at 86.
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improvement, primarily through the vehicle of literature and his-
tory . ."52 In Jefferson's view, as with "all the other founders
who gave significant attention to pedagogy [,]. . . [t]he goal of
education . . . was to produce free moral agents whose will to do
good was matched by a knowledge of how and where to do the
most good.""
James Madison also demonstrated concern over the influ-
ence of bad company, as shown in a letter Madison wrote to his
college friend William Bradford. He told Bradford that he
should shun "those impertinent fops that abound in every City to
divert you from your business and philosophic amusements....
I am luckily out of the way of such troubles, but I know you are
cirrounded [sic] with them for they breed in Towns and popu-
lous places, as naturally as flies do in the Shambles.""
Madison's experiences, even if later in his life and after the
time relevant to the First Amendment, seem to have borne out
the concerns Jefferson had expressed with regard to travel to
Europe:
[W]hen [Madison's stepson John Payne] Todd reached
Montpelier in mid-September, it was apparent that though
he was more handsome and courtly than ever, he was also
on the verge of becoming, irredeemably, a desolate fop,
always late, full of excuses, and adept only at losing money
playing cards. . . . He had become a classic example of the
young American, warned of by Franklin and Jefferson, who
was so dazzled by the courtly graces of Europe that he
became unfit for useful life in his own country.5 5
With regard to the readings the Framers found vital, Jeffer-
son said, "a thorough training in the classics [w]as indispensable
for every well educated American."5" Furthermore, it appears
that he placed value on reading those classics in their original
Greek and Latin.5 1 John Adams also appears to have been
equally at home with the classics. It is suggested that his personal
library, at over 3000 volumes, the second-largest private library in
the early United States, contained almost 100 volumes of Greek
52. GAUSTED, supra note 47, at 149.
53. Id. at 151.
54. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIocRAPHY 52-53 (1971).
55. Id. at 601. It has been said that, during the last years of Madison's
presidency and the first years of his retirement to Montpelier, Todd had taken
to wandering and that "[u]sually his mother did not know where he was until
she received a letter asking for money." FRANK DONOVAN, THE WOMEN IN THEIR
LwEs: THE DISTAFF SIDE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 320 (1996).
56. KARL LEHMANN, THOMASJEFFERSON, AMERICAN HUMANIST 195 (1947).
57. See id.
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and Latin classics in their original languages.5 1 "Adams's diary
and correspondence indicate the extent to which his study of
classical authors influenced his every-day life. As with other edu-
cated men of his time, a familiarity with Greek and Latin authors
was taken for granted."5
The influence of Plato on Adams might be questioned. One
author notes that Adams' copy of the Republic, with its marginal
comments, "indicate that an American living in the eighteenth
century sought to apply the remarks of the ancient Greek philos-
opher to contemporary events,"60 but also says of Adams that "his
opinion of the great Greek philosopher was uncomplimen-
tary."' One can certainly see how an American patriot, strug-
gling to establish a new democracy, might find Plato's
governance by the Guardians distasteful and unwise. But per-
haps that skepticism should not call into question the wisdom of
Plato's other philosophical positions. Whatever his views on
Plato, it was said that Adams had great admiration for Theognis
of Megara and that Horace was his favorite among Roman
authors.
Turning to more modern philosophers, it was not only
Locke's political thought that captured the imagination of the
Framers. Thomas Jefferson both owned and recommended
Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education." There seems to be
some disagreement over the influence of Francis Hutcheson on
Jefferson. While Jefferson included him on his reading list, it is
said that he never owned a copy of Hutcheson's System." Even
disregarding Hutcheson's influence on Jefferson, it appears
likely that Hutchinson's writings would have had some impact on
James Madison. The year before Madison enrolled at Princeton,
then the College of New Jersey, John Witherspoon had been
appointed president and "remade the college into a major out-
post of the Scottish Enlightenment, introducing his students to
the moral philosophy of Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and
Lord Kames, and the social science of Adam Ferguson, Adam
Smith, and David Hume.""
58. See Dorothy M. Robathan, John Adams and the Classics, 19 NEw ENC. Q.,
91, 91 (1946).
59. Id. at 93.
60. Id. at 96-97.
61. Id. at 94.
62. Id. at 94-95.
63. See HELLENBRAND, supra note 44, at 41.
64. See id. at 51.
65. JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMIERICAN
REPUBLIC 3 (Oscar Handlin ed., 2d ed. 2002).
THE FRAMERS, CHILDREN, AND FREE EXPRESSION
At least some of Alexander Hamilton's readings are indi-
cated by his advice to an adversary that he read Locke, among
others." While Hamilton is likely to have been talking about the
social and political philosophy of these authors, their thoughts
on other areas would seem likely to have had some influence. It
does have to be admitted that acceptance of a philosopher's
views on one subject does not necessarily carry over to the philos-
opher's views on other subjects; however, the philosophical views
on children and education seem, while perhaps not at the fore-
front of the work of many of these philosophers, to have been
important and would have come to the attention of the
Framers.
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS IN THE ERA OF THE FRAMING
A number of philosophers, and not only from the then-
recent past, would have influenced the Framers. Their philo-
sophical foundations, like the foundations of philosophy in gen-
eral, would have gone back to the Greek Era. It is said that, for
many of the Framers, Greek and Latin were "virtually second
tongues."" "[T]he men of the revolutionary generation were,
for the most part, steeped in what are known as the classics."" It
makes sense, then, to begin with the ancient philosophers,
before going on to the then-more contemporaneous.
A. Plato
Plato devotes some effort to discussing not only the educa-
tion of youth but also to the need to shield youth from negative
influences. In Book II of The Republic, after spending some time
talking about the education of youth, Socrates presents the need
to limit children's access to negative influences. "You know also
that the beginning is the most important part of any work, espe-
cially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time
at which the character is being formed and the desired impres-
sion is more readily taken."o Glaucon, Socrates' conversant in
the dialog, accepts that statement, and Socrates continues. "And
shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales
which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their
66. See WHITE, supra note 11, at 79.
67. This is especially true of the writings of John Locke. See infra notes
127-29 and accompanying text.
68. GEORGE H. NASH, BooKS AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 8 (1989).
69. Id. at 9.
70. PlATo, THE REPUiBLIC bk. II, at 49 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover
Publ'ns, 2000) (c. 360 B.C.E.).
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minds ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we
should wish them to have when they are grown up?"" Glaucon
again agrees that that cannot be accepted, and Socrates goes on:
Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the
writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of
fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire
mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized
ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even
more fondly than they mould the body with their hands;
but most of those which are now in use must be
discarded.
Plato provides some detail with regard to the sort of influ-
ence from which children are to be shielded. As an example, he
points to the Greek myths regarding the struggle between Ura-
nus and Cronus. He says:
[W]e shall never mention the battles of the giants, or let
them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent
about the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes
with their friends and relatives. . . . [T]hese tales must not
be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to
have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person
can not judge what is allegorical and what is literal; any-
thing that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to
become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most
important that the tales which the young first hear should
be models of virtuous thoughts.73
It means nothing to Plato that some of what might be cen-
sored is great literature. He provides examples of literary
passages that he considers obnoxious and in need of oblitera-
tion. He then explains:
[W]e must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry
if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they
are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but
because the greater the poetical charm of them, the less
are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant
to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death.
It appears that he would go beyond simply shielding chil-
dren and compel the poets to produce only more wholesome
fare. Again turning to Homer and his description in The Iliad of
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 50.
74. Id. at 57.
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the bloody deeds of the sons of the gods, Plato says that the poets
should state either that the acts were not done by the purported
actors or that those actors were not the sons of gods; "both in the
same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm."75 To attri-
bute these acts to the sons of gods will have a bad effect on those
hearing them by providing excuses for their own vices; "therefore
let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of morals
among the young."76
It is clear that Plato is concerned about children modeling
their behavior on what they see around them. Speaking specifi-
cally with regard to the children who will become the Guardians,
Socrates says:
[I]f they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth
upward only those characters which are suitable to their
profession-the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the
like; but they should not depict or be skilful [sic] at imitat-
ing any kind of a illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation
they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never
observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and con-
tinuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become
a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?77
While his concern at this point in the text may have been
with regard to children of the Guardians, his observation that the
imitations of youth become lifelong habits do not seem to be so
restricted. They express a general concern for the influences
faced by the young.
It is clear that Plato goes beyond what at least contemporary
American views on the parent-child relationship will tolerate.
Limits on the exposure of children to negative influences, for
Plato, included limiting the influences to which parents might
expose the children.7" This seems to be consistent with his view
on how his Republic was to operate. The state was to be the sole
trainer of the children. It was the state, not the parent, who
would raise children.
75. Id. at 63.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 67.
78. See PLATo, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 202. Plato expressed his views regarding the state's role, stating:
They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of
the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of
their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents;
these they will train in their own habits and laws, I mean in the laws
which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution
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While not the words of the Framers, the Supreme Court has
expressed its view with regard to the role of parents, as opposed
to the state, in raising children. In Meyer v. Nebraska,o the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that for-
bade the teaching of any foreign language, other than the
ancient or dead languages, in any school, public or private, to
any students who had not already finished the eighth grade. The
Court was asked to determine whether this limit violated the lib-
erty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. That liberty is,
the Court said, "not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right .. . to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children,.. . and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."s'
The Court found this imposition of homogeneity unaccept-
able, and in doing so, it discussed both Plato and the practices
said to have occurred in Sparta:
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato sug-
gested a law which should provide: "That the wives of our
guardians are to be common, and their children are to be
common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any
child his parent. . . . The proper officers will take the off-
spring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there
they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the
better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away
in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be." In
order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citi-
zens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks
and intrusted [sic] their subsequent education and train-
ing to official guardians. Although such measures have
been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their
ideas touching the relation between individual and State
were wholly different from those upon which our institu-
tions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature
could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State
without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the
Constitution.8 2
of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily attain happi-
ness, and the nation which has such a constitution will gain most.
Id.
80. 262 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1923).
81. Id. at 399.
82. Id. at 401-02.
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Again, these are not the words of the Framers, but these
words do show Plato's argument for the control that the state
should have in raising children. This control even comes at the
expense of parents, which is an argument that runs counter to
the long held and deep values of American culture. While
Adams' dislike for Plato may run most strongly to Plato's
antidemocratic bent,8 3 it is not unreasonable to believe that it
would also attach to the idea that the state, rather than parents,
should have charge of a child's education and upbringing.
Indeed, the position would seem almost mandatory in a state
founded on dissent from the mandated orthodoxy of a national
religion.
There is less reason to believe that the Framers would also
have rejected Plato's observations on the impact of negative
influences on the child. Rejection of the state's exclusive role in
determining a child's influences does not mean that all those
who would provide input are to be treated equally. The concern
that children be shielded from negative influences may justify
limiting the interactions of those who are strangers to the family
with the children of that family, even if they do not justify the
state's interference with the parent-child relationship.
There is one additional area in which Plato might be argued
to differ from the views of the Framers, although this is far less
certain. Plato seemed willing to generally prohibit literature
which would be harmful to children. 84 Such an approach runs
counter to the position that the Supreme Court took in Butler v.
Michigan," where the defendant had been convicted of violating
a state obscenity statute that banned all sexual material that
would tend to corrupt the morals of youth. The Court said:
It is clear on the record that appellant was convicted
because Michigan . . . made it an offense for him to make
available for the general reading public (and he in fact
sold to a police officer) a book that the trial judge found to
have a potentially deleterious influence upon youth. The
State insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading
public against books not too rugged for grown men and
women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercis-
ing its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is
to burn the house to roast the pig.8 6
83. See Robathan, supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
84. See PLATO, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
85. 352 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1957).
86. Id. at 382-83.
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While Plato may have been willing to suppress completely
material that might have a negative influence on children, the
Butler Court was not willing to allow the state to limit the adult
population to reading only material fit for children. That con-
clusion seems reasonable, although it may be less clear what the
Framers would have thought about it, given the sparse evidence
of their intent regarding expression for entertainment and only
the later judicial extension of First Amendment protection to
speech for entertainment purposes.
B. Aristotle
Aristotle also provides guidance on the raising of children.
In Book II, Chapter 3, of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle wrote:
For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and
pains; it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things,
and on account of pain that we abstain from noble ones.
Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular
way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight
in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is
the right education.8 7
This upbringing includes efforts to limit the development of
the child's appetites:
[T]hat which desires what is base and which develops
quickly ought to be kept in a chastened condition, and
these characteristics belong above all to appetite and to the
child, since children in fact live at the beck and call of
appetite, and it is in them that the desire for what is pleas-
ant is strongest. If, then, it is not going to be obedient and
subject to the ruling principle, it will go to great lengths;
for in an irrational being the desire for pleasure is insatia-
ble and tries every source of gratification, and the exercise
of appetite increases its innate force, and if appetites are
strong and violent they even expel the power of calcula-
tion. Hence they should be moderate and few, and should
in no way oppose reason-and this is what we call an obe-
dient and chastened state-and as the child should live
according to the direction of his tutor, so the appetitive
element should live according to reason."
87. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs bk. II, ch. 3 (c. 384 B.C.E.), reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1744 (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
1984).
88. Id. at bk. III, ch. 12 at 1767 (footnote omitted).
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In Politics, Aristotle provides much more specific advice on
the upbringing of children. In the early stages of life, Aristotle
saw children receiving education within the household. He sug-
gested care in supervising how children spend their time and in
limiting their exposure to certain influences. This extended to
conversation:
As a general point, then, the legislator must banish shame-
ful talk from the city, as he would any other shameful
thing, for the result of lightly saying whatever is shameful is
that one also behaves in a similar way. Therefore it should
above all be banished among the children, so that they
neither say nor hear anything of the sort.89
It also extended to entertainment:
[I] t should not be granted to younger people to witness
iambus or comedy until they have reached the age at which
it is appropriate for them to participate in sitting at the
table and drinking, at which time their education will
make them entirely unaffected by the harm that comes
from such things.90
This shielding is to last, perhaps, to the age of twenty-one,
the age at which Aristotle considered a person to be ready for
political life."
It is worth noting that Aristotle did see more value in drama
and entertainment than Plato may have seen. 2 The value for
Aristotle was in the catharsis that viewing a tragedy would
bring." This identification with a victim and the purging of
emotion could well be seen as positives.9 4 Sissela Bok, however,
89. ARISTOTLE, POLITIcs bk. VIII, at 33 (J.L. Ackrill & LindsayJudson eds.,
Richard Kraut trans., Clarendon Press 1997).
90. Id. at 33-34.
91. See id. at 165. Aristotle, like Plato, seems to see the state as playing,
through child-supervisors, a supervisory role over the parents in the education
of their children. See id. at 158.
92. See, e.g., Gerald F. Else, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, POETICs 1, 2-8 (Ger-
ald F. Else trans., 1967) (comparing Plato's banishment of the poets because of
their removal from reality and their catering to emotions to Aristotle's more
positive assessment).
93. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 89, at 25 ("Tragedy, then, is a process of
imitating an action which has serious implications, is complete, and possesses
magnitude; by means of language which has been made sensuously attractive,
with each of its varieties found separately in the parts; enacted by the persons
themselves and not presented through narrative; through a course of pity and
fear completing the purification of tragic acts which have those emotional
characteristics.").
94. Gerald F. Else discusses catharsis in his notes to ARISTOTi.E, POETICS,
supra note 92, at 97-99.
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notes that Aristotle's acceptance of catharsis did not extend to
children. Catharsis, for Aristotle, was "only for adults mature
enough to derive the fullest benefit from such an experience."9 5
Thus, any disagreement between Plato and Aristotle over the
suitability of some varieties of entertainment for adults does not
carry over to children."
C. Others from the Classical Era
While Theognis of Megara was said to have had some influ-
ence on the Framers," he provides only limited guidance on the
issue under consideration here. Theognis wrote a series of
poems to a young man named Kurnos, offering him the benefit
of his experience. In the poems, he expresses concern over the
influences Kurnos may face:
These things I tell you, Kurnos, for your good:
I learned them, as a boy, from gentlemen;
Rule one: no honour, prize, or cash reward
Can justify a base or crooked act.
The second rule: avoid 'low' company,
Mix only with the better sort of men.
Drink with these men, and eat, and sit with them,
And court them, for their power is great; from them
You will learn goodness. Men of little worth
Will spoil the natural virtue of your birth.9 8
For Theognis, evil is not inborn but is learned.
The bad did not spring evil from the womb:
Rather, in company with evil men
They learned low ways, vile words, and violence,
And swallowed everything their low friends said.9"
Interestingly, while believing that evil companions can turn
a good young man toward evil, Theognis seems to believe that
movement in the opposite direction is less likely or even
impossible:
95. SissElA BOK, MAYHEM: VIOLENCE AS PUBLic ENTERTAINMENT 43 (1998).
96. It may also be that the Poetics would have had less influence on the
Framers than the other works discussed. Else describes the Poetics as "abrupt,
elliptical, sometimes incoherent, to a degree unexampled among Aristotle's
other acroamatic works." Else, supra note 92, at 10. The resultant difficulty in
reading this work together with its lesser relevance to the business of establish-
ing a new country may make its influence less likely.
97. See Robathan, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
98. Theognis, Elegies [27-36], reprinted in HESIOD AND THEOGNIS 98 (Doro-
thea Wender trans., 1973). See also id. at 139 [1169] ("Bad comes from bad
companionship . . . .").
99. Id. at 107 [305-08].
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It's easier to get and raise a child
Than to put character in him. No one
Has ever found a way to make a fool
Wise or bad man good.
... And if good sense
Could be man-made and planted in a child,
Good fathers, giving sensible advice,
Would never have bad sons. I wish it could,
But teaching cannot make a bad man good.'00
While the passage may indicate impossibility, the position
that it is only very difficult is supported by a slightly later passage
contending that:
Good becomes bad more easily than bad
Turns good.' 0 '
The belief in the possibility of good turning evil, through
evil influences, coupled with the at least improbable movement
in the other direction, may be the result of Theognis' personal
history as an aristocrat who lost status and, probably, money in a
popular revolution.'O2 His dislike for the lower classes, and his
equating of the lower classes with the bad and aristocrats with the
good,'os may have led him to the conclusion that downward
movement is at least far more likely than upward.
Horace also voiced the view that quality breeding would
need to be accompanied by strong guidance. In Book 4 of his
Odes, Horace writes:
From strong and good men issue the strong and good;
In cattle and in horses the sire's good strain
Is seen, and fiercely warlike eagles
Never have peaceable doves as offspring;
And yet an inborn vigor requires a guide;
From right things nurtured, hearts gain an oaken strength;
As soon as right behavior lapses
Natural excellence grows disfigured.1 0 4
This seems to be little guidance on the issue under consider-
ation here, despite any influence of Horace generally on the
100. Id. at 111-12 [429-38].
101. Id. at 116 [577-78].
102. See Dorothea Wender, Introduction, in HESIOD AND THEOGNIS, supra
note 98, at 89.
103. See id. at 92.
104. HORACE, ODEs bk. 4, at 29-36 (c. 13 B.C.E.), reprinted in THE COM-
PLETE WORKS OF HORACE 315 (Charles E. Passage trans., 1983).
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Framers,105 other than that even wellborn children require
guidance.
D. Lockelob
John Locke's influential work in social political philosophy
also contains some indication of his beliefs regarding children.
In Chapter VI of the Second Treatise of Government, Locke discusses
paternal power. He notes that, while Adam may have been cre-
ated as a perfect man, his descendents are born weak, helpless
and lacking in knowledge and understanding; therefore, parents
have an obligation found in the law of nature to care for and
educate their children.""17 "To inform the mind, and govern the
actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its
place, and ease them of that trouble, is what the children want,
and the parents are bound to . . . ."0 This includes placing
restrictions on the child's liberty:
To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has
reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege
of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst
brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as
much beneath that of a man, as theirs.10 9
While Locke's very limited discussion of children in his polit-
ical works may be of interest, his real contribution on this issue
comes in his works on psychology and education. In his An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, Locke addressed the idea of
innate knowledge. He argued against the position that there
were propositions whose truth was innately known and univer-
sally assented to. He found general maxims on which there
might be wide agreement not to be known "to children, idiots, and
a great part of mankind.""o Rather than knowledge being
innate, it is arrived at through the senses:
105. See Robathan, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
106. The work of Thomas Hobbes would fit in here from a chronological
perspective, but he does not add much to this discussion. Given his general
unwillingness to recognize individuals' rights against the sovereign, see gener-
ally, THOMAs HOnBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XXI (Clarendon Press 1958) (1651), there
would really be no First Amendment rights to apply to children. That is, if
adults have no rights against the sovereign, children, especially given the con-
trol Hobbes sees for parents, would certainly not have any right to obtain mate-
rial that the sovereign thought should not be directly provided them.
107. SeeJoHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LmirrR CON-
CERNING TOLERATION 123 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003) (1690).
108. Id. at 124.
109. Id. at 126.
110. JOHN LocKE, 1 AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 23
(John W. Yolton ed., Aldine Press 1965) (1689).
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[A]mongst children, idiots, savages and the grossly illiter-
ate, what general maxims are to be found? What universal
principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and nar-
row, borrowed only from those objects they have had most
to do with, and which have made upon their senses the
frequentest and strongest impressions.1 "'
Locke would allow that infants may be born possessing cer-
tain ideas, but even these ideas were not truly innate. He
explained, "I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their
senses about objects that affect them in the womb, receive some few
ideas, before they are born."" 2
Experience was, for Locke, the source of knowledge. He
asks the question, "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say,
white paper void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes
it to be furnished?"'" To that question he provides an answer:
To this I answer, in one word, from experience, in that all
our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately
derives itself. Our observation, employed either about
external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our
minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which sup-
plies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.
These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all
the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."
Since children come into the world with no, or few, ideas,
and because experience provides knowledge, it is only by degrees
that children obtain that knowledge:"'
Follow a child from its birth and observe the alterations that
time makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the senses
comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes
to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has
matter to think on." 6
An aspect of learning through experience is the possibility
of receiving ideas that are in some sense false. While this may
also happen with adults, Locke expressed particular concerns
that children might be so influenced to a degree that might not
be undone:
There is nothing more ordinary than that children should
receive into their minds propositions (especially about
111. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted).
112. Id. at 112.
113. Id. at 77.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 79.
116. Id. at 88.
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matters of religion) from their parents, nurses, or those
about them: which, being insinuated into their unwary as
well as unbiased understandings, and fastened by degrees,
are at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by
long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being
pulled out again." 7
Given Locke's contributions to philosophical, and to what
would reasonably be described as psychological, thought, it is
hardly surprising that he would produce a work on education."'
That work, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, capturing Locke's
centrality of experience, called for the exercise of great care in
shaping the development of children and recognized that the
education provided would be seen as responsible for the person
who resulted:
[T] he difference to be found in the Manners and Abilities
of Men, is owing more to their Education than to any thing
[sic] else; we have reason to conclude, that great care is to
be had of the forming Children's Minds, and giving them
that seasoning early, which shall influence their Lives
always after. For when they do well or ill, the Praise or
Blame will be laid there: And when any thing [sic] is done
untowardly, the common Saying will pass upon them, That
it is suitable to their Breeding." 9
Locke believed that children must be taught to submit to the
will of others, while they are young, if they are later to be able to
submit their wills to their own reason.' 20
Locke expressed particular concern with regard to children
learning violence, the central concern behind the attempts to
limit access to certain video games. He believed not only that
children saw examples of, but seemed actually schooled in, vio-
lence, revenge and cruelty:
Give me a blow that I may beat him, is a Lesson, which most
Children every Day hear: And it is thought nothing,
because their Hands have not Strength to do any Mischief.
But I ask, Does not this corrupt their Minds? Is not this the
way of Force and Violence, that they are set in? And if they
117. 2 LocKE, supra note 110, at 302.
118. Locke was asked by friends for his thoughts on how to educate their
young son. His letters to them were later published. See John W. & Jean S.
Yolton, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION
§ 1, at 1 (John W. & Jean S. Yolton eds., 1989) (1693) [hereinafter SOME
THOUGHTS CONCERNING ErucATION].
119. Id. at 103 (emphasis omitted).
120. See id. at 105.
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have been taught, when little, to strike and hurt others by
Proxy, and incouraged [sic] to rejoyce [sic] in the harm
they have brought upon them, and see them suffer, are
they not prepar'd to do it, when they are strong enough to
be felt themselves, and can strike to some purpose?' 2 '
This concern really does seem a close analogy to the con-
cerns over video games. If the games teach that success is to be
attained through violence, and children learn to rejoice in that
virtual harm, are they not being prepared to engage in real world
violence, when they become so capable? It would appear that,
for Locke, the answer would be yes.
At other points, Locke discusses more generally the need to
shield children from negative influences. In discussing how chil-
dren learn manners, he says that they are more likely to be
learned by example than through rules and that children, "if
kept out of ill Company, will take a pride to behave themselves
prettily, after the fashion of others, perceiving themselves
esteemed and commended for it."1 2 2 Among the negative influ-
ences children might face, and from which they should be insu-
lated, was the behavior of servants:
And here is another great inconvenience which Children
receive from the ill Examples, which they meet with
amongst the meaner Servants. They are wholly, if possible,
to be kept from such Conversation: for the contagion of
these ill precedents, both in Civility and Vertue [sic], horri-
bly infects Children, as often as they come within reach of
it. They frequently learn from unbred or debauched Ser-
vants such Language, untowardly Tricks and Vices, as oth-
erwise they possibly would be ignorant of all their Lives.' 2 3
While couched in terms of servants, the main non-family
members with whom a child would have contact, the concerns
could not be any less with regard to non-members of the house-
hold. Locke added that children should be "kept as much as may
be in the Company of their Parents, and those to whose care they are
committed."2 2 And, this concern was not only with regard to
very young children. As would later be reflected in the advice of
Thomas Jefferson, Locke suggested that children generally be
kept close to home:
This I am sure, a Father that breeds his Son at home, has
the Opportunity, to have him more in his own Company,
121. Id.
122. Id. at 124.
123. Id. at 127.
124. Id.
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and there give him what Encouragement he thinks fit; and
can keep him better from the taint of Servants, and the
meaner sort of People, then is possible to be done
Abroad.' 2 5
Locke's educational thoughts were to apply to children "not
only whilst they are young, but to be continued even as long as
they shall be under another's Tuition or Conduct." 26
Locke's thoughts here are important not only because they
support the position that children are to be shielded from nega-
tive influences and express particular concern with regard to vio-
lence, although that is clearly of importance. What is also
important is the influence of Locke's writings on the issue on the
Framers. Locke was certainly not a philosopher who would have
escaped the Framers' notice.' 2 ' Beyond the importance of his
political philosophy, Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education
was extremely popular, with more than a dozen editions printed
in the first half of the 18th century.' 2 g Furthermore, Locke's
work on education is said to have been less controversial than
any other of Locke's major works.' 29
E. Rousseau
Another important social political philosopher for the Fram-
ers was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who also wrote on learning and
the education of children. In his work Emile, Rousseau takes a
position similar to that of Locke in that children learn through
their experiences."1o As with Locke, that recognition leads to a
concern over what experiences a child may confront. He says,
"As soon as the child begins to take notice, what is shown him
must be carefully chosen."1"' This structuring of experiences
required limiting the access of others to the child. Rousseau
said, "You will not be master of the child if you cannot control
125. Id. at 132.
126. Id. at 143.
127. See Margaret J. M. Ezell, John Locke's Images of Childhood: Early Eight-
eenth Century Response to Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in 17 EIGHT-
EENTH-CENTURY STUD. 139 (1983). The popularity of this work is spoken to by
the assertion that "it would have been virtually impossible for a literate person
to have been unaware of Locke's theories on children." Id. at 148-49.
128. See id. at 147.
129. See id.
130. SeeJEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, EMILE 31 (Barbara Foxley trans., 1911)
(1762) ("In the dawn of life, when memory and imagination have not begun to
function, the child only attends to what affects its senses. His sense experiences
are the raw material of thought .
131. Id. at 30.
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every one about him. . . ,"i32 and added that it was better to raise
a child in the country, because in a village the child's tutor will
have more control over what the child sees.133
Beyond cognition, judgment is also developed through
experience. Speaking again of the child, Rousseau says "every-
thing he sees and hears makes an impression on him, he keeps a
record of men's sayings and doings, and his whole environment
is the book from which he unconsciously enriches his memory,
till his judgment is able to profit by it.""s So, with respect to
conduct as well as to knowledge, the child's experiences must be
controlled:
To select these objects, to take care to present him con-
stantly with those he may know, to conceal from him those
he ought not to know, this is the real way of training his
early memory; and in this way you must try to provide him
with a storehouse of knowledge which will serve for his
education in youth and his conduct throughout life. 13 1
While in the context of a discussion on the development of
sexual knowledge, Rousseau suggested that children be kept
innocent as long as possible:
To know how far a happy ignorance may prolong the inno-
cence of children, you must live among rude and simple
people. It is a sight both touching and amusing to see
both sexes, left to the protection of their own hearts, con-
tinuing the sports of childhood in the flower of youth and
beauty, showing by their very familiarity the purity of their
pleasures.' 3 6
The best way to achieve this result is not to give curiosity the
chance to arise, and Rousseau suggests that not all questions a
child might ask be answered.13 7
132. Id. at 59.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 76.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 177.
137. Id. Rousseau does recognize that it may not be possible to keep a
child in ignorance.
Complete ignorance with regard to certain matters is perhaps the best
thing for children; but let them learn very early what it is impossible to
conceal from them permanently. Either their curiosity must never be
aroused, or it must be satisfied before the age when it becomes a
source of danger. . . . [I]f you are not sure of keeping him in igno-
rance of the difference between the sexes until he is sixteen, take care
you teach him before he is ten.
Id. at 178. Simply being in the company of others, particularly those of the
opposite sex, is likely to raise curiosity, and Rousseau seems to be suggesting
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Rousseau, too, seemed to express the particular concern
over what children might learn from their observations of vio-
lence. He at least said that these observations would have a par-
ticularly strong impact:
The explosive passions produce a great effect upon the
child when he sees them; their outward expression is very
marked; he is struck by this and his attention is arrested.
Anger especially is so noisy in its rage that it is impossible
not to perceive it if you are within range.' 3 8
This, too, would seem to speak to the concerns that have
been raised over violent video games. Even if the virtual experi-
ence of violence differs in some ways from the real-world experi-
ence, in both cases the "attention is arrested" and the violence
perceived.
F. Others - The Moral Intuitionists
There are a number of other philosophers who, while per-
haps not as widely read today, would have had some influence on
the Framers. The fact that they did not write in as much depth
on children and education might speak against their inclusion.
Nonetheless, they did have something to say, and the fact that
some of them did not share the views already presented with
regard to the clean slate with which children come into the world
makes their views worth considering.
David Hume, currently the most widely read of the group,
sees something beyond a tabula rasa. Hume said:
The social virtues must . . . be allowed to have a natural
beauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all
precept or education, recommends them to the esteem of
uninstructed mankind, and engages their affections. And
as the public utility of these virtues is the chief circum-
stance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the
end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some
way agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural affec-
that the curiosity be addressed at an age at which hormonal influences may be
less. The suggestion seems to be that, if there is going to be what Rousseau sees
as a negative curiosity, there should be early training to counter the effects of
that curiosity. This in no way speaks against attempting to limit children's
experiences, if that is possible, and being sure that any such influences are
under the control of the parent or tutor.
138. Id. at 60.
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tion. It must please, either from considerations of self-
interest, or from more generous motives and regards.' 39
Thus, there appears to Hume to be more than a clean slate;
there must be some intuitive sense of the good. Hume further
says, in this regard, "[t]he notion of morals, implies some senti-
ment common to all mankind, which recommends the same
object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most
men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it."14 0
Such a position might seem to leave little room for concerns
over education and the influence of others in the development
of morality. But Hume did acknowledge a role for education.
Addressing the position that all moral distinctions are the result
of education, Hume says:
This principle, indeed, of precept and education, must so
far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it may fre-
quently encrease [sic] or diminish, beyond their natural
standard, the sentiments of approbation or dislike; and
may even, in particular instances, create, without any natu-
ral principle, a new sentiment of this kind .... 141
Hume's position was not that no principles of morality find
their roots in education. He argued only that not all morality
stems from that origin.' 4 2
Some of this concern for education, even in the face of an
intuitive basis for morality, may be the result of a concern over
temptation. Hume says that few are successful in their pursuit of
happiness in that "considerable cause" of this failure is a lack of
the strength of mind to resist the temptation to seek present
pleasures over "more distant profit and enjoyment." 4 3
Elsewhere, Hume discusses the role experience and, particu-
larly, the likelihood of errors among the young. In discussing
cause-and-effect, the inference of which he sees as essential to
human existence, he sees the need for something more than "the
fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its opera-
tions; appears not, in any degree, during the first years of
infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life,
139. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRAus 40(J. B. Schneewind ed., 1983) (1777).
140. Id. at 74-75.
141. Id. at 39.
142. See id. ("[B]ut that all moral affection or dislike arises from this ori-
gin, will never surely be allowed by any judicious enquirer.").
143. Id. at 54-55.
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extremely liable to error and mistake."' While consistent with
the view that some inherent capacity is required, there is a dis-
tinction between children and adults, even if all are prone to mis-
takes. Later in the same work, Hume discusses the recognition
of cause-and-effect among the animals. Here, too, he distin-
guishes between the young and the mature. "The ignorance and
inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from
the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long
observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave
ease or pleasure.""15 While a discussion of animals centered on
the recognition of pleasure, it adds to the distinction between
human children and adults and speaks to "the great force of cus-
tom and education, which mould the human mind from its
infancy, and form it into a fixed and established character."I146
While Hume does not express a view on shielding children
from negative influences, there appears to be nothing in his phi-
losophy inconsistent with the views of others on the need for
such protection, and indeed his views on the role of education
and the danger of temptation would seem to support such a
position.
Adam Ferguson also finds the basis for moral judgment in
intuition:
The merit of this character . . . is more a subject of con-
sciousness, or intuitive judgment, than of discussion or rea-
soning; and they who are, in common life, most decided in
their choice of good actions, proceed upon the ground of
their affections and sentiments, more than upon any infor-
mation derived by investigation or research."'
But, he too finds a role for education. He adds that "the
defects of instinct must be supplied by reflection; and, he is to be
taught, by experience and observation alone, to distinguish the
real sources of permanent happiness."' And, he sees youth as
more prone to error than adults:
In this progressive state of man, much is gained in the
steps which are made from the cradle to the grave; and
progression ever supposes that what is gained in any suc-
cessive period, was wanting in a former. The just notions of
144. DAVID HumE, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: A
CRITIcAl. ErTION 45 (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., Clarendon Press 2000) (1748).
145. Id. at 79.
146. Id. at 66.
147. 2 ADAM FERGUSON, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 35
(Rena Wellek ed., Garland Publishing Inc. 1978) (1792).
148. Id. at 38.
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things, the candour, resolution, and force of mind, which
are gained in manhood and age, were wanting in youth or
childhood.... The intelligent being, at his outset, though
qualified to obtain knowledge, not only must begin in
ignorance; but, while he continues to learn, is still short of
omnisciences, and may be exposed to error.14 9
Given the shortcomings of youth, Ferguson elsewhere says
that the parent is under a duty "to maintain, to protect, to edu-
cate, his child .... ."15o Thus, for this intuitionist as well, finding
moral judgment to be based in instinct does not mean that edu-
cation and learning play no role. While not being emphatic in
the need for parents to shield children from negative influences,
the recognition that children are more prone to mistake, the
role of experience in lessening the likelihood of mistake, and the
admonition to parents to both educate and protect their chil-
dren hardly show a philosopher at odds with the cautions advo-
cated by Locke.
Francis Hutcheson was still another moral intuitionist. In
fact, he used children to support his position that there is a uni-
versal moral sense. He noted that, prior to any instruction, chil-
dren always react to stories they have been told by "passionately
interest [ing] themselves on that side where Kindness and Human-
ity are found" in "detest[ing] the Cruel, the Covetous, the Selfish, or
the Treacherous.""' But he as well does not reject a role for edu-
cation and, for that matter, for faith:
[S]o may Men who have a moral Sense, acquire an Opinion
by implicit Faith, of the moral Evil of Actions, altho they do
not themselves discern in them any tendency to natural
Evil; imagining that others do: or, by Education, they may
have some Ideas associated, which raise an abhorrence
without Reason.' 5 2
So, he argues not that faith, education, and presumably
experience play no role in morality but only that, "without a
moral Sense, we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under
any other View than as naturally disadvantageous to our selves." '5
Thus, another of the moral intuitionists, while disagreeing with
Locke that all knowledge is purely the result of experience, and
while not specifically speaking for or against the need to shield
149. 1 FERGUSON, supra note 147, at 184-85.
150. ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 247 (1769).
151. FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS
OF BEAUTY AND VIRTUE 216-17 (3d ed. 1729).
152. Id. at 216.
153. Id.
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children from negative influences, takes positions on education
that are at the very least not inconsistent with Locke's admoni-
tion to shield children.
Lord Kames also wrote from an intuitionist point of view.
He specifically criticized Locke for omitting "appetites and affec-
tions, and the desires and the aversions involved in them" from
his system.'"5 Kames sees mankind as having more than the
instincts of brutes. "He is endued with a moral sense or con-
science, to check and controul his principles of action, and to
instruct him which of them he may indulge, and which of them
he ought to refrain."'5 5 This moral sense, our feelings with
regard to actions as being fit and right or unfit and wrong,
appears to be primitive, in the sense of being irreducible to other
concepts.15 6
Kames considered the original inhabitants of the earth to
have been brutish and savage and addressed the argument that
this original Hobbesian state shows that moral virtues are not nat-
ural but are the result of education and societal regulation. He
rejected the conclusion that education could be sufficient:
[W]hatever be the influence of education and example,
'tis an evident truth, that they can never have the power of
creating any one sense or feeling. They may well have the
effect of cherishing and improving the plants of nature's
formation, but they cannot introduce any new or original
plant whatever.157
The difference between this original condition and life in
society is explained by the increased security in society putting an
end to the fears that may have provoked early man to acts of
cruelty.' 5" But, it appears that that is not all there is to it. Kames
noted that, while we may have direct impressions of particular
objects, we understand complex ideas and abstract propositions
through education and practice:' 59
We have no reason then to conclude . . . that even the
greatest savages are destitute of the moral sense. Their
defect rather lies in the weakness of their general princi-
ples of action, which terminate in objects too complex for
154. HENRY HOME KAMES, ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALnlY AND
NATURAL RELIGION 15 (1751).
155. Id. at 79.
156. See id. at 49-50 ("These are simple feelings, capable of no definition,
and which cannot otherways be explained, then by making use of the words
that are appropriated to them.").
157. Id. at 137.
158. See id. at 139.
159. Id.
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savages readily to comprehend. This defect is remedied by
education and reflection; and then it is, that the moral
sense, in concert with these general principles, acquires its
full authority, which is openly recognised [sic] and cheer-
fully submitted to.is0
The moral sense, while it may be based in the nature of
humanity, "admits of great refinements by culture and educa-
tion. It improves gradually like our other powers and faculties,
'till it comes to be productive of the strongest as well as most
delicate feelings."'"' What has been said of the savage or brute
would seem to speak also to the child. If the savage is incapable
of complex judgment, so too would seem to be the child. If cul-
ture and education would refine and strengthen the moral sense
in one, they would seem necessary for the other as well. Thus,
still another intuitionist sees a strong role for education and cul-
ture in any developed sense of morality and would recognize a
distinction between children and adults.
Turning to entertainment, Kames spent some effort in a dis-
cussion of the theater and its impact on morality:
To a dry philosopher, unacquainted with theatrical enter-
tainments, it may appear surprising, that imitation should
have such an effect upon the mind, and that the want of
truth and reality should not prevent the operation of our
passions. But whatever may be the physical cause, one
thing is evident, that this aptitude of the mind of man,
receive impressions from feigned, as well as from real
objects, contributes to the noblest purposes of life. Noth-
ing conduces so much to improve the mind, and confirm it
in virtue, as being continually employed in surveying the
actions of others, entering into the concerns of the virtu-
ous, approving of their conduct, condemning vice, and
showing an abhorrence at it; for the mind acquires
strength by exercise, as well as the body. 6
Thus, theatrical performances could help in the develop-
ment of the moral sense, but it requires that the viewer con-
demn, and even show abhorrence, with regard to vice. This
seems a far cry from the glorification of vice and violence in play-
ing violent video games.
Kames also notes that this impact of theater can be particu-
larly strong and long-lasting. He says:
160. Id. at 141-42.
161. Id. at 143.
162. Id. at 19-20.
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'Tis no wonder that young people flock to such entertain-
ments. The love of novelty, desire of occupation, beauty of
action, are strong attractions: and if one is once engaged,
of whatever age, by entering into the interests of the per-
sonages represented, the attraction turns strong beyond
measure, and the story must be followed out, whatever be
the consequence. The foresight of running one's self into
grief and affliction will not disengage. But people generally
turn wise by experience . . . .
This passage would seem to reflect the concerns of those
who argue that identification of the player with the video game
character engaged in violent activity will have an impact on the
player, at least until the player turns wise by experience.
One additional philosopher of the era, although perhaps
more thought of as a scientist, who expressed views that at least
touch on the issue here was Joseph Priestley. One of Priestley's
works provided a model of education for those who would fill
important positions in areas not considered to be among the
learned professions. In that work he considered the possibility of
imposing his plan by law but argued against such an approach.
Part of his argument concerned the role of the parent in the
education of his or her child:
What then can be more justly alarming to a man who has a
true taste for happiness, than, either that the choice of his
wife, or the education of his children should be under the
direction of persons who had no particular knowledge of
him, or particular affection for him, and whose views and
maxims he might utterly dislike? . . . If any trust can be said
to be of God, and such as ought not to be relinquished at
the command of man, it is that which we have of the edu-
cation of our children, which the Divine Being seems to
have put under our immediate care, that we may instruct
them in such principles, form them to such manners, and
give them such habits of thinking and acting, as we shalljudge to be of the greatest importance to their present and
future well-being. 16 4
If this is an argument against state control of the education
of children, at the expense of their parents, it would presumably
also be a call for limiting the influence of non-state strangers to
the family on children.
163. Id. at 21.
164. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON A COURSE OF LIBERAL. EDUCATION FOR
CIVIL AND AccIvE LIFE 153-55 (1765).
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Thus, it appears clear that even the moral intuitionists, while
disagreeing with the likes of Locke, would not totally discount
the impact of education and upbringing. The position is well
summarized by Thomas Reid:
The education of Nature, without any more human care
than is necessary to preserve life, makes a perfect savage.
Human education, joined to that of Nature, may make a
good citizen, a skilful [sic] artisan, or well-bred man. But
Reason and Reflection must superadd their tutory, in
order to produce a Rousseau, a Bacon, or a Newton. Not-
withstanding the innumerable errors committed in human
education, there is hardly any education so bad, as to be
worse than none. . . . Most men continue all their days to
be just what Nature and human education made them.
Their manners, their opinions, their virtues, and their
vices, are all got by habit, imitation, and instruction; and
Reason has little or no share in forming them.' 6 5
While nature and intuition may provide a starting point,
education is important in forming the good citizen and well-bred
person, the sort of individual the Framers would presumably
want populating the new country. While some Rousseaus,
Bacons or Newtons would be of great benefit to the country,
democracy would seem to require at least the sort of individual
that results from human education. If their manners, opinions,
virtues, and vices arc the result of education and imitation, it
would seem important to exercise some control over whose
behavior is imitated.
V. RELIGIOUS, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL INFLUENCES
A. Religion
Beyond philosophical influences, some attention must be
paid to religious influence, even if some of the most important
members of the generation of the Framers may have lacked the
zealotry of some of the earlier colonialists. For example, Jeffer-
son encouraged his nephew Peter Carr "to approach religion not
with the passion of the devout but with the dispassionate inquisi-
tiveness of the empirical scientist and the trial lawyer."'6 6 Even if
taking a different, more analytic, approach, it does still show a
religious influence. That being said, there is not, in fact, that
much to be gleaned from religious works.
165. THoMAs REID, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN MIND: ON THE PRINCI-
PLES OF COMMON SENSE 202 (Derek R. Brookes ed., 1997) (1785).
166. HELLENBRAND, supTa note 44, at 53.
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The Bible does offer advice on discipline. Proverbs 13:24
says, "He who spares the rod hates his son, but he who loves him
is diligent to discipline him."'17 Repeating the advice, Proverbs
23:13-14 provides "[dio not withhold discipline from a child; if
you beat him with the rod, he will not die. If you beat him with a
rod you will save his life from Sheol."'" Additionally, Proverbs
29:15-17 provides "[t]he rod and reproof give wisdom, but a
child left to himself brings shame to his mother. When the
wicked are in authority, transgression increases; but the right-
eous will look upon their downfall. Discipline your son, and he
will give you rest; he will give delight to your heart."'16  And,
Proverbs 22:5-6 provides "[t]horns and snares are in the way of
the perverse; he who guards himself will keep far from them.
Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he
will not depart from it."' 7 o The most relevant advice on the influ-
ence of others is found at Proverbs 23:19-21. "Hear, my son, and
be wise, and direct your mind in the way. Be not among winebib-
bers, or among gluttonous eaters of meat; for the drunkard and
the glutton will come to poverty, and drowsiness will clothe a
man with rags."' 7 1 While not speaking of entertainment, and
while an admonition to the child rather than the parent, this pas-
sage does indicate the need to avoid negative influences.
Passages from the Bible are, of course, not the only place to
look for religious influences. The colonialists had their own
influential ministers that led to specific religious traditions
regarding the raising of children in colonial America. Philip
Greven provides an exhaustive study of differing religious views
regarding the raising of children in early America and recognizes
three distinct groups, the evangelical, the moderate, and the
genteel.172
Taking the religious traditions in that order, it is at first clear
that in evangelical families there would be little to no recogni-
tion of children's rights:
[T]he focus of authority and the source of love were
united in the parents, who dominated the household and
determined the principles and practices that were to shape
the temperaments of their offspring. Within the confines
167. THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE 784 (Herbert G. May & Bruce
M. Metzger eds., 1962).
168. Id. at 794.
169. Id. at 801.
170. Id. at 792.
171. Id. at 794.
172. See PHILIP GREVEN, THE PROTESTANT TEMPERAMENT: PATTERNS OF
CHILD-REARING, RELIGIous EXPERIENCE, AND THE SELF IN EARLY AMERICA (1977).
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of the nuclear family, children found no alternatives, no
defenses, no mitigation, no escape from the assertion of
power and the rigorous repressiveness of their parents.1 73
The position of the evangelicals was that parents must break
the will of their children early in the children's lives:' 7 4
The parent-child relationship ... was shaped by a stark and
sharply defined gulf between the generations-an enor-
mous and unbridgeable distance between parents and chil-
dren, which implicitly denied to children any rights to
their own desires, needs, or wishes that might be at odds
with those designed for them by their parents.' 7 5
If it is not already clear from this description of the parent-
child relationship, there is also authority for the position that
others would not be allowed to interfere with the parents'
authority. Rev. John Witherspoon, the president of Princeton at
the time of James Madison's enrollment,'7 1 warned parents
against the influence of household servants.' 7 7 Other evangelical
ministers even warned against the influence of grandparents,
suggesting that children would be corrupted by their overindul-
gence.' 7 ' Given these positions with regard to the wishes of chil-
dren, even limiting the influence of grandparents, evangelicals
would certainly not have believed that children had the right to
obtain entertainment materials from strangers to the family.
Children in moderate families were treated differently from
those in evangelical families, but it appears that the aims of the
parents and the overall results were similar. Moderate families
did not believe that their children's wills must be broken, but
they strove toward obedience by infusing a sense of duty, rather
than fear: 7 9
Moderates preferred to bend rather than to break their
children's wills; but the process was no less effective for
being less direct and explicit. The pressures upon their
children were consistent, persistent, and profoundly influ-
ential. In the end, moderates were as intent as evangelicals
upon ensuring the obedience of their children. Although
the children of moderates grew to maturity with the sense
that their own wills were free and within their own power
173. Id. at 25.
174. Id. at 35.
175. Id. at 34.
176. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
177. See GREvEN, supra note 172, at 26-27.
178. See id. at 27.
179. See id. at 151.
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to control, they also developed consciences which ensured
that they, too, would prefer to choose the ways set forth for
them rather than counter their parents' wills and
wishes. "0
Moderates also did not isolate their children in the same way
evangelicals did. But, that does not mean that they turned the
world loose on their children. Rather, they welcomed the rela-
tionship between their own parents and their children. For
example, John and Abigail Adams spoke very positively regarding
the example set by and instructions received from
grandparents.' 8 '
It is worth emphasizing that moderates, despite this belief
that children's wills need not be broken, were strongly interested
in the upbringing of their children:
[T] he moderates were concerned with the process of growth
and development in their children from infancy to adult-
hood. Their goal from the outset was to mold the temper-
aments and values of their children gradually so that the
commitment to reason, virtue, and piety that shaped their
own lives would also, in due course, shape the lives of their
children. The persistent emphasis by moderates on the
"tenderness" of children implied a degree of malleability
and susceptibility to influence and external impressions
that would make unnecessary the confrontations and bat-
tles of wills which so often characterized the relationship of
evangelical parents with their children.' 8 2
While the passage seems to speak primarily to the positive
example set by parents and grandparents for their young chil-
dren, parental concerns extended into youth as well; neverthe-
less, it was believed that the early development of conscience
would result in youths capable of withstanding later temptation.
Mercy Otis Warren, with regard to her son who was about to
enter college, felt that he was "'well disposed, against the snares
of vice, and the contagion of bad example, which like an army of
scorpions, lie in wait to destroy.'"" Similarly, Abigail Adams,
after her son had gone abroad with his father, still expressed anx-
iety: "'[L]est the numerous temptations and snares of vice
should vitiate your early habits of virtue, and destroy those princi-
ples, which you are now capable of reasoning upon, and discern-
ing the beauty and utility of, as the only rational source of
180. Id. at 152.
181. See id. at 154.
182. Id. at 170.
183. Id. at 176.
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happiness here, or foundation of felicity hereafter.""8" These
are not the statements of people who would allow their children
to do what they wish, even if the shaping of their children's per-
sonalities was more subtle, and not the statements of individuals
who would want to hold their children open to negative influ-
ences from outside the family.
The third group, the genteel, appear to have been far more
lax in disciplining their children. The genteel parent seems to
have been indulgent, and compared to the children of evangeli-
cal and moderate families "the children of genteel families too
often seemed undisciplined, too free in their behavior, spoiled in
their clothes and diet, vain, arrogant, and unchecked."' Gen-
teel parents felt great affection for their children, and the chil-
dren's wills were neither to be broken nor bent: "The few
descriptions that are to be found of their early behavior suggest
an exuberance, a joyfulness, a delight in unbounded play which
seems to have characterized the first five or six years of life for
the children of genteel parents." 6
If there is any colonial tradition in which children would be
allowed to choose their own forms of entertainment, and per-
haps in which outside influences would not be carefully con-
trolled, this would appear to be it. It might be argued that this
lack of parental discipline is overstated, because it appears that
discipline was provided by servants,' and the discipline was
actually quite severe, with whipping as the chief disciplinary
tool.' However, the results of genteel childrearing clearly dif-
fered from the other religious schools:
The most important consequence, and the most striking
difference in character from an evangelical or a moderate,
is the evident lack of conscience among the youthful mem-
bers of these genteel families. The genteel simply did not
have consciences as active, as punitive, or as constrictive as
those evident among both evangelicals and moderates."
Perhaps the fact that most calls into question the relevance
of the genteel family is the demographic makeup of the group.
Genteel families were families of wealth and power found prima-
rily in New England and in the middle Atlantic colonies.so
184. Id. at 177.
185. Id. at 269.
186. Id. at 274.
187. See id. at 274-75.
188. See id. at 278-79.
189. Id. at 281.
190. See id. at 267.
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There appears to have been a good number of Anglicans in the
group.'"' As Anglican families of wealth and power, they may
well have been more likely to be Loyalists than Congregational-
ists such as John Adams.' 2 If so, the influence of the genteel
approach among the Framers would have been limited.
B. Psychology
Psychology and philosophy would have been seen as less dif-
ferentiated from each other in the 18th century than in the pre-
sent era. The views of Locke regarding the tabula rasa and the
subsequent attainment of cognitive knowledge and morality is
clearly as much psychology as it is philosophy. Much the same
may be said of the others discussed in the section on philosophy.
These individuals are, for the era, the equivalent of today's aca-
demic psychologists, but there was also a sort of popular psychol-
ogy to be considered. The Framers, while certainly influenced by
the philosophers/psychologists, would also likely have been
influenced by generally held beliefs regarding the psychological
status of children.
There is a sense in which childhood might be seen as the
product of modern times. When children and parents lived in
close proximity and lacked privacy, children would have been
exposed to things that would now seem improper. If people
lived at a subsistence level, an extended childhood would be a
perhaps unaffordable luxury. Thus, a tradition of an extended
and shielded childhood might be seen as a modern practice.
Much of the scholarly basis for this view is found in the work
of the French scholar Philippe Aries.'" Aries discusses a taboo
that he sees as rather modern. "One of the unwritten laws of
contemporary morality, the strictest and best respected of all,
requires adults to avoid any reference, above all any humorous
reference, to sexual matters in the presence of children. This
notion was entirely foreign to the society of old."' 94 The exam-
ple with which he follows the claim is drawn from entries in the
diary of the physician to Henry IV regarding the young life of
191. See Bruce E. Steiner, New England Anglicanism: A Genteel Faith?, 27WM
& MARY Q. 122 (1970). Steiner argues that not all Anglicans were genteel, with
some rather lacking in wealth, but does seem to see the Anglican Church as a
home for the genteel.
192. See GREVEN, supra note 172, at 154 ("John Adams ... [was] the son of
a Congregational deacon").
193. Aries' work may be found in translation as PHIIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES
OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAl. HISTORY OF FA~intY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., 1962)
(1960).
194. Id. at 100.
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Louis XIII."' The example does describe behavior by and
toward the young prince that would now seem completely inap-
propriate but seems to have been acceptable in the early 17th
century. It might, of course, be that the princely status of Louis
allowed behavior that would not have been proper with regard to
other children, but Aries sees "no reason to believe that the
moral climate was any different in other families, whether of
nobles or commoners; the practice of associating children with
the sexual ribaldries of adults formed part of contemporary
manners." 1
Interestingly, Aries notes a change in what was expected as
Louis reached the age of seven. Sexual jokes disappeared in
1608, when Louis "had to be taught decency in language and
behaviour.""' Thus, even in that era there may have been differ-
ences between early childhood and adults, even if youths were to
learn the decency expected of adults, although allowing early
sexual exposure, while limiting later indecency, would seem con-
trary to modern practice.'" Aries also suggests, however, that
this change may have been brought about as part of a larger
change. " [T] hese tardy scruples of decency are to be attributed
to the beginnings of a reformation of manners, a sign of the
religious and moral restoration which took place in the seven-
teenth century."'"9 It seems that around the end of the 16th cen-
tury influential pedagogues, whose views would carry into the
17th century, rejected the idea of allowing children access to
indecent material, marking what Aries saw as the beginning of a
respect for childhood.2 00 "A great change in manners took place
in the course of the seventeenth century. . . . An essential con-
cept had won acceptance: that of the innocence of
childhood."2 0 '
195. See id. at 100-02.
196. Id. at 103.
197. Id. at 102.
198. Aries suggests two reasons for this early view.
[T]he child under the age of puberty was believed to be unaware of
or indifferent to sex. Thus gestures and allusions had no meaning for
him; they became purely gratuitous and lost their sexual significance.
Secondly, the idea did not yet exist that references to sexual matters,
even when virtually devoid of dubious meanings, could soil childish
innocence, either in fact or in the opinion people had of it: nobody
thought that this innocence really existed.
Id. at 106.
199. Id. at 102.
200. Id. at 109. Aries says that the change in attitude occurred in France
and in England and among Protestants and Catholics. Id.
201. Id. at 110.
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Of course, any great change taking place in France during
the course of the 17th century, or even taking place in France
and England in that period, would not necessarily reflect what
was occurring in everyday life in early colonial America. In fact,
Ross Beales, in examining what he calls "the myth of miniature
adulthood," examines the assertion that even 18th century colo-
nial Americans did not recognize a distinct period of child-
hood.2 02 Beales does seem to recognize some basis for this claim
of miniature adulthood, noting for example that in Plymouth
Colony whole families went to church together and were equally
expected to learn from what they heard there.2 0 3 On the other
hand, Beales points to the work of David Stannard as a
contraindication:
Recently, however, David E. Stannard has suggested that
"there is no real evidence to support the contention that in
17th century New England, as in 15th and 16th century
France, there was little or no distinction between children
and adults." He notes, for example, that Puritan journals,
autobiographies, histories, and family manuals make "clear
distinctions between adults and children well into their
teens" and that the law definitely discriminated "between
acceptable behavior and appropriate punishment for chil-
dren, post-adolescent youths and adults." 204
Beales backs this position up with his own observations of
church records in drawing distinctions between those of differ-
ing ages.2 05 Beales concludes that "[1] anguage, law, and religious
thought and practice thus suggest that New Englanders, far from
regarding children as 'miniature adults,' recognized their imma-
turity."206 He does also recognize some suggestion of a separate
youth culture, at least in the New England of the 18th century,
and says that " [i]f this culture was not so sharply separated from
the adult world as today's adolescent 'cultures,' the explanation
202. See Ross W. Beales, Jr., In Search of the Historical Child: Miniature Adult-
hood and Youth in Colonial New England, 27 Am. Q. 379 (1975). He considers, for
example, the assertion that "Eighteenth-century Massachusetts children 'did
not live separated from the society in a protected preserve of carefree inno-
cence; they were part of a single undifferentiated community."' Id. at 380
(quoting MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINcDoMs: NEw ENGLAND TowNs IN
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 73 (1970)).
203. See id. at 382.
204. Id. at 383 (quoting David E. Stannard, Death and the Puritan Child, 26
ANi. Q. 457-59 (1974)).
205. See, e.g., id. at 387-88.
206. Id. at 391.
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may be that Puritan youth did not live in as highly an age-strati-
fied society as today's adolescents."2 0 7
Perhaps the most important distinction between any "minia-
ture adulthood" in 15th and 16th century France and in 17th
and 18th century New England is in what that phrase would
imply. In the French example, "miniature adulthood" seemed to
speak to exposure of children to what would now be seen as inap-
propriate sexual language and activity. The licentiousness of the
adult world could be seen as reaching down to the world of chil-
dren. That would hardly seem to be the problem for Puritan
New England. Even if there were no distinctions between chil-
dren and adults, there was a lack of licentiousness to affect chil-
dren. Rather, the effect of treating children as "miniature
adults" would be to demand rigid adherence from them to a
stringent adult code of behavior. Even if children were "minia-
ture adults" in such a setting, that certainly would not indicate
that they would be left to their own choices in terms of their
activities.
C. Law
As is generally the case, the best source on the common law
the United States inherited from England is Blackstone. Black-
stone notes the duty of parents to provide their children an edu-
cation suitable to their role in society but also notes that most
countries do not make this a legal duty.208 He does point to the
laws regarding apprenticeship for poor children but notes that
the rich are left to their own, with the exception of a "peculiar"
restriction regarding religion. The law provided for the levy of a
fine "if any person sends any child under his government beyond
the seas, either to prevent it's [sic] good education in England,
or in order to enter into or reside in any popish college, or to be
instructed, persuaded, or strengthened in the popish relig-
ion . . . ."21o While the rights of parents are restricted in this one
way, the restriction seems motivated by concerns over the influ-
ence of Catholicism and may not speak to more general limita-
tions on the rights of parents regarding their children.
Blackstone notes that Roman law provided that a father had
the power of life and death over his children but goes on to say
"[t] he power of a parent by our English laws is much more mod-
erate; but still sufficient to keep the child in order and obedi-
ence. He may lawfully correct his child, being under age, in a
207. Id. at 396.
208. See 1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *438-39.
209. Id. at 439.
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reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his educa-
tion."21 Despite the potential criminal liability of a child at age
seven and clear liability at fourteen, 2 11 which would seem to be a
recognition of maturity, the legal power of a father over his chil-
dren in English law lasted until the children reached twenty-
one.212 While these provisions do not speak directly to the issue
of children and entertainment, given this power of parents over
their children, it seems reasonable to conclude that, under the
laws of the colonies or of the early states, there would be no right
on the part of children to have access to entertainment of which
their parents did not approve or of others to provide such
entertainment to children contrary to the wishes of parents.
VI. CONCLUSION
So, what of James Madison's stepson, Thomas Jefferson's
daughter, and the children and charges of the other Framers?
Would their parents and guardians have accepted that they had a
right to obtain materials such as violent video games, had such
things existed, and that vendors and arcade owners had a right to
provide those materials? The answer must be a clear "no." Every-
thing the Framers knew and believed would have to have led to
that conclusion.
What writings exist from the Framers themselves indicate a
concern over the development of children. Character developed
in the period of youth, and Jefferson understood the impact of
both positive and negative influences and recommended shield-
ing children from the negative. Madison, too, expressed the
belief that bad influences should be avoided.
The Framers were quite familiar with the works of philoso-
phers, both ancient and the more contemporary. With regard to
the ancient philosophers, Plato is the most clear on the need to
avoid exposing children and youths to negative influences. Aris-
totle seemed similarly concerned, although he would not have
gone as far as Plato. While Plato would have banned, generally,
material that would have negatively impacted youth, Aristotle
merely called for shielding children from such influences.
Among the then more contemporary philosophers, Locke
would have had the greatest influence. Given Locke's belief that
the mind of the newborn is a clean slate and that all is learned
through experience, he could not help but be concerned over
the influences a child faced. He wrote of those influences and of
210. Id. at 440.
211. See id. at 452.
212. See id. at 441.
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the need to shield children from the negative and expressed a
particular concern over exposure to violence, the very concern
raised by violent video games. Rousseau expressed similar con-
cerns over shielding children generally, and he too showed par-
ticular concern over exposure to violence. Even the moral
intuitionists, while denying the absolutely clean slate and believ-
ing that humans must have some innate sense of morality, saw a
role for experience in the further development of that sense, a
rule that would include shielding the child from some
influences.
Other influences on the Framers would have reinforced this
view. Religious influences, with the possible and probably minor
exception of the genteel, called for parents to either break or
mold the will of their children. Children were to be shielded
from outside influences, for some even including the influence
of children's grandparents. The academic psychology of the era
was largely the philosophy of the era, but even the popular psy-
chology at the time appears to have distinguished children from
adults and does not speak against the work of the academic phi-
losophers/psychologists. The law of the era, furthermore, recog-
nized the authority of parents over their children, and it would
not have given the right, either to children or to vendors, to
obtain or provide materials of which the parents would
disapprove.
From the preceding analysis it seems impossible to claim to
be an originalist, while maintaining that children have a right
directly to obtain violent video games and that the video game
industry has a right to provide those materials directly to chil-
dren. While parents might be seen to have a right to obtain the
games for their children, a right on the part of children and ven-
dors clearly runs contrary to the beliefs of the Framers.
One may, of course, be a textualist and be guided not by
what the Framers believed but by what they said in the First
Amendment. The problem with that approach here is that the
absolute tone of the text is clearly unworkable and could not
have been intended. If criminal liability could never be based on
oral or written acts, crimes such as conspiracy and solicitation
could not exist. The text is seemingly unreadable, divorced from
its context.
The freedoms of speech and the press must have had a spe-
cific meaning. Perhaps that meaning was nothing more than
that found in Blackstone that one be allowed to speak or publish,
even if later being subject to punishment for having done so, as
has been argued by Leonard Levy. On the other hand, Vincent
Blasi's argument that the Framers intended more strongly to pro-
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tect the ability of the people to criticize government, supported
as it is by references to Madison and Jefferson, is also plausible
and may, in fact, be more representative of what was intended by
the text.
Moving toward the most expansive view of the text, it is plau-
sible that, had the Framers considered the issue, they might have
included entertainment within the expression protected by the
First Amendment. After all, Alexander Meiklejohn, having first
taken the position that free expression is limited to speech per-
taining to self-government,"' did later come to the position that
"there are many forms of thought and expression within the
range of human communications from which the voter derives
the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the
capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possi-
ble, a ballot should express." 214  Among those forms are
instances of expression that would be considered entertainment.
Plausibly, had the Framers considered the issue, they would have
reached the same conclusion as that reached by the Supreme
Court in Winters v. New York.2 " Forced to confront the issue of
whether the First Amendment protected entertainment, the
Court found the line between the two too difficult to draw.216
What is implausible is that the Framers would, even if they
had accepted that the free expression clauses apply to entertain-
ment, have thought that the First Amendment provides a right
for children to obtain whatever entertainment materials they
desire and a right for those producing and distributing such
materials to reach an audience of children. Everything that I
have analyzed about what the Framers knew, from the writings of
the important philosophers of the era, religious teachings, popu-
lar psychology, and law, spoke against such an extension of free
expression rights. Any originalist analysis of the video games
issue would have to conclude that the states have a right to shield
children from such expression, even if it is a right that might be
overridden by the contrary wishes of the child's parents.
213. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SEIF-
GoVERNMENr (1948).
214. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 245, 256.
215. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
216. Id. at 510.
